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The description of Africa and Africans during the Enlightenment period by philosophers like 
David Hume, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel suggests a kind of description which 
denotes Africans in a derogatory sense. For instance, Africans were described in a manner 
which suggests that they are irrational and sub-humans. Thus, these descriptions in recent 
times have birthed several movements, ranging from pan-Africanism and epistemological 
theories such as Afrocentrism, with the Black Hypothesis being one popular but recent 
response to the Eurocentric description of Africa. The thrust of this paper is to critically 
examine the Eurocentric description of Africa from the perspectives of Hume, Kant and 
Hegel, and to refute their claims using the Black Hypothesis as a paradigm. The paper asserts 
that the racial slurs against Africans by Enlightenment philosophers cannot be scientifically 
proven as there exist philosophical and anthropological discovered that have shown that 
Africa (Egypt) is the cradle of civilization. The concluding thesis of this paper is that the 
Black Hypothesis is another dimension to understanding how the Eurocentric description of 
Africa can be rejected.  
Introduction 
Philosophy is essentially a reflective activity. To philosophize is to reflect on human 
experience in search of some fundamental questions. As a man takes a reflective look at 
himself or the world around him, he is filled with “wonder”, and some fundamental questions 
arise in his mind. When he reflects on these questions in search of answers, he is 
philosophizing (Omoregbe, 1998, 3). The nature of philosophizing is innate in man. Since the 
ancient period of philosophy, philosophers have attempted to ask questions as they relate to 
their respective environment. For instance, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, also 
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known as the Ionians, tried to know the substratum of reality, and they all said that reality is 
made up of water, indefinite boundless element (Apeiron), and air respectively. 
The discourse on the nature of man and his environment took another dimension 
during the period of Enlightenment. By Enlightenment, we mean: 
The beginning of modernity, the time when the basic questions facing our world 
were posed…, the Enlightenment can be seen from two vantage points: on the one 
hand, its shapers and followers undertook far-ranging critique of the world they had 
inherited… on the other hand, proponents of the Enlightenment attempted to 
establish adequate grounds and surer understanding… In short, the Enlightenment 
was characterized by the dynamic between criticism and innovation (Wilson and 
Reil, 2004, 4). 
 
One obvious claim that can be deciphered from the above assertion is that Enlightenment 
marked the beginning of the modern period of philosophy, and the philosophers had two 
major tasks: one is their thesis of criticizing the period of philosophy prior to them, that is, 
the medieval period. The obvious reason for this is that there was no scientific discovery 
during this period, as medieval philosophers were concerned with metaphysical issues; for 
instance, the concept of God, problem of evil, freewill etc. This explains the reason why 
Immanuel Kant, for instance, argued that the motto of Enlightenment is our ability to use our 
understanding. As he puts it: “Sapere aude! (“dare to know”) “Have courage to use your own 
understanding!” – that is the motto of enlightenment” (Kant, 2009, 1).   The second task of 
the Enlightenment philosophers was to innovate and universalize discourse on morality, 
language, science, knowledge, etc. Thus, during the period of Enlightenment, there was an 
enthronement of reason above traditions and authorities, especially religious authorities that 
characterize the medieval period of philosophy. From another perspective, Jonathan Israel 
writes that the Enlightenment “not only attacked and severed the roots of traditional 
European culture in the sacred, magic, kingship, and hierarchy, secularising all institutions 
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and ideas, but effectively demolished all legitimation of monarchy, aristocracy, woman’s 
subordination to man, ecclesiastical authority, and slavery, replacing these with the principles 
of universality, equality and democracy” (Isreal, 2001, 1). 
On the issue of race as it concerns the period of Enlightenment, Eze, in Achieving 
Our Humanity: The Idea of the Post-racial Future, succinctly captures how Africa was 
denigrated as follow: 
The Enlightenment, under the aegis of race knowledge, produced in Africa a realm of 
darkness where some humans could quite conveniently be philosophically judged as 
incapable of reason and freedom and unworthy of responsibility. When those who 
were racially frozen as other uncritically accepted this identity, it became difficult to 
find philosophico-theoretical grounds to think of oneself as free and responsible. The 
false choice was either to succumb to racial degradation or to seek an essence that 
never existed – now the essence of ‘emotion,” then the essence of “blackness,” and 
then again the essence of “sun people.” Thanks to modern racial encounters, 
unreason, whether in form of emotion of irresponsibility in European anthropology 
and philosophers, was no longer thought of as located within Europeans. Unreason 
remained strange, dreadful, even exotic; but hence forth its representations would be 
conveniently located in cultures outside of Europe, against whom anthropology and 
philosophy must now heteronomously manifest a racialized, white, sovereign reason, 
order, and humanity (Eze, 2001, 60). 
 
The imperative of the above statement by Eze is to expose the trajectory of the description of 
Africa using derogatory terms. Africa, during this period was described using some 
terminologies which distinguished it from the west; for instance, ascribing “blackness” to 
Africa. In this sense, the use of “blackness” and other terms like “primitive”, “savage”, 
“barbaric” and other terms presuppose Africa/Africans. This was one of the tasks of the 
Enlightenment philosophers, and it birthed the idea of Eurocentrism, an ideology and 
philosophy that sees Europe as the paradigm of culture, humanity and history. 
The thesis of this paper is to attempt an expository account of the Eurocentric 
description of Africa by some Eurocentric philosophers. By Eurocentric description we mean 
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the description of Africa that suggests inferiority, backwardness, barbarism, blackness, etc., 
as found in the works of some Enlightenment philosophers and European sociologists. In 
their works, Africa and Africans appear in a sense which portrays them as people who are not 
capable of reason. For the purpose of direction, however, we shall examine the theses of 
David Hume, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel. In what follows, an attempt will be made to 
jettison their theses as recent philosophical and anthropological discoveries, with reference to 
Black Hypothesis, have shown that while the writings about Africans by these philosophers 
remain till date, their ideas that Africa and the cultures of its inhabitants are “tainted” and 
their assumption “that the cultural characteristics of African people could only reach a 
significant level by contact with the outside world (Europe) – is a misconception that does 
not qualify as being historically valid, scientifically adequate, or culturally sound” 
(Adegbindin, 2015, 37).  
David Hume’s Eurocentric Description on Africa 
Hume stands out as one of the prominent Enlightenment philosophers who had a 
Eurocentric view of reason, arguing that only the European race is superior to other races. 
However, it is important to attempt an exposition of Hume’s theory of human nature. On this 
basis can we be able to show if Hume had a thorough-going Eurocentric description Africa 
(ns).  
In what is regarded as his first major work, A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume 
argued that his major objective is to “introduce the experimental method of reasoning into 
moral subjects.” By experimental method, it is an attempt to understand the human person 
from an empirical perspective. Understandable, Hume meant to explicate some substantial 
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issues regarding human nature, and also, the social, historical and cultural differences that 
exist among humans. 
No doubt, David Hume was influenced by Descartes; although, Hume travelled to 
Jesuit, France, to launch an attack on Cartesianism. According to Eze, “in a study entitled 
Descartes and Hume, Ezra Talmor showed that the young Hume’s sojourn in France – at the 
Jesuit College at la Fleche, to be precise – were more that pilgrimages to the heartland of 
Cartesianism solely to ‘attack’ it” (Eze, 2001, 60). . Eze went further to state that “Hume 
developed an enthusiasm for Descartes’s ideas, and often regard it as ‘the most profound 
philosophy’ of the time” (Eze, 2001, 60). . The implication of this idea formed what Hume 
calls “anatomical philosophy”, a combination of the philosophical disquisitions of Descartes 
and Newton; this gave rise to Hume explains his idea of human nature by stating that his 
anatomical philosophy will help in bringing about “a completely general theory of human 
nature to explain why humans beings act, think, perceive and feel in all the ways they do” 
(Stroud, 1977, 4). Hume stated that using the empirical and experimental approach to the 
study of human nature will ensure a proper exploration of it, and thereby making the human 
nature the only science of man. As he argued in the introduction to his A Treatise of Human 
Nature: 
In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect 
propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, 
and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. And as the science of 
man is the-only solid foundation for other sciences, so is the only solid foundation we 
can give this science itself must be laid on experience and the observation (Hume, 
1739, 183). 
 
Importantly, many regard Hume as a thoroughgoing skeptic – which is presumably 
more likely to be incorporated in his discussion of human nature. On the contrary, however, 
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Hume argued that human nature can be understandable because nature permitted it to be so. 
Consequently, Hume further stated, just like Descartes, that nature is the foundation upon 
which human nature is based. He did not deny being a skeptic, but that nature had instilled in 
us the power to feel, see and do other things which are inherent in human nature, and any 
attempt to deny such is “superfluous”. As he captures it in his Treatise: 
Should it here be asked me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem 
to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those skeptics, who 
hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possess of any 
measures of truth and falsehood; I should reply, that this question is entirely 
superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly 
of that opinion (Hume, 1739, 183).   
 
Hume statement as contained in his Treatise corroborates our argument of him not denying 
that human nature exists, not minding the fact that he remained a thorough-going skeptic. 
Regarding the role of nature in the argument regarding the existence and non-existence of 
human nature, Hume further stated that: 
Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as 
well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a 
stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connection with a present 
impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long, as we are awake, or 
seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad 
sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total skepticism, has 
really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavoured by arguments to establish a 
faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and rendered 
unavoidable (Hume, 1739, 183).  
 
What Descartes did on logical ground, that is, Cogito ergo sum, Hume did on natural ground. 
Put differently, Descartes logical conclusion was that the act of doubting is a proof that one 
exists. For Hume, the acts of seeing, feeling and the experience of other sensations is a 
epiphenomenal of nature. The implication of Hume’s emphasis on nature is how he 
conceptualized moral philosophy. Accordingly, Hume argued that moral philosophy from the 
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perspective of Hume “studies human thoughts, actions, and feelings, and conventions, 
customs, and traditions” (Eze, 2001, 61). 
It is important at this juncture to state how relevant Hume’s idea of human nature 
serves as the basis of the Eurocentric description of Africa. Hume made his psychology the 
foundation of racial discourse by stating that nature had allowed some races to be superior to 
other races. Hume argued that there are four to five races, but their cognitive and 
psychological dispositions differ. This breeds varieties among men. In particular, Eze in 
Achieving Our Humanity captures the nexus between Hume’s theory of human nature and his 
description of non-Europeans. According to him: 
Since nature produced not only differences among humans by race but also unevenly 
endowed the races with the resources required for mental development and cultural 
progress, Hume thought that some races have high levels of mental capacities and that 
others do not. Although he believed that mind or the self is not a fixed substance, 
Hume nevertheless thought that nature itself did not establish in some humans, as it 
did not in nonhuman animals, the capacity to develop or use levels of intelligence 
available in the higher philosophical determinations of the mind—the spheres of 
perception responsible for production of the sciences, the arts, and "eminent" (i.e., 
moral) action (Eze, 2001, 61).  
 
No doubt, judging by the above statement by Eze, Hume sees some races as superior to other 
races. This is evident in Hume’s description of Africa (ns) as “Negroes”, and those that are 
naturally inferior to the whites. In his famous footnote in his book entitled Of national 
characters, Hume says: 
I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely 
ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent in 
action or speculation; no ingenuous manufacturers amongst them, no arts, no 
sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the 
ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about 
them… Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen… if nature had not 
made original distinction betwixt these three breeds of men. Not to mention our 
colonies, there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever 
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discovered any symptom of ingenuity; tho’ low people, without education, will start 
up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession (Hume, 1985, 629). 
 
What is the significance of Hume’s assertion about the Negroes? It is Hume’s 
distinction between the Europeans and Africans, that is, “whites” and “Negroes” as that 
which had been ordained by nature. This is in consonance with Hume’s theory of human 
nature. Consequently, to the Enlightenment philosophers, the whites are not only seen as 
superior race, but also, other non-Europeans, especially Africans, are regarded as sub-
humans, savages, irrational, etc., and their ways of doing things is barbaric and archaic. 
 Few years after Hume described Africans as “Negroes” in the footnote Of National 
Characters, a posthumous version was released in the year 1777; in this version, Hume had 
edited the first footnote, that is, he rewrote the first two lines. As he puts it: 
I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely 
ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either 
in action or in speculation (Hume, 1985, 629).  
 
 The implication of Hume’s alteration is that it limits the idea of inferiority to Africans and 
people of African descent. Hence, Hume’s statement serves as the basis of analyzing 
societies, cultures, nations and human development. 
Evaluating Hume’s Eurocentric description of Africa, can way Hume was a racist? 
Imperatively, though, racism did not appear as a term during the Enlightenment period, but 
contemporary discussions on Hume have pointed out that Hume’s description of Africa and 
its inhabitants makes him a racist. We can adjudge Hume to be a racist on the basis of 
D’Souza’s description of who a racist is. According to D’Souza: 
 In order to be a racist, you must first believe in the existence of biologically 
distinguishable groups or races. Second, you must rank these races in terms of 
superiority and inferiority. Third, you must hold these rankings to be intrinsic or 
innate. Finally, you typically seek to use them as a basis for discrimination, 
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segregation, or the denial of rights extended to other human beings” (D’Souza, 1996, 
28).  
 
Regarding D’Souza’s first reason that makes one a racist, Hume believes that the 
biological make-up of the whites is superior to that of the Negroes; secondly, Hume argued 
that the whites, even the most barbaric among the them like the ancient “GERMANS” and 
present “TARTANS”, are superior to the Negroes; the third reason stated by D’Souza’s can 
be understood within the context of Hume’s conception of human nature as Hume argued 
that the superiority of the whites over the Negroes is made possible by nature; lastly, Hume’s 
description of the Negroes in Of national characters suggests “discrimination”, 
“segregation” and “denial of rights” to the Negroes. Accordingly, Ikuenobe writes that: 
“D’Souza’s view captures a commonplace view that, in general, racism presupposes racial 
differences, the belief in the superiority of one race over the other, and negative attitudes 
toward the inferior race (Ikuenobe, 2019, 4). 
The implication of Hume’s stereotype of Africa is that other Enlightenment 
philosophers followed closely in his footsteps; for instance, Kant in one of his essays, On the 
Varieties of the Different Races of Man and his book, Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and Sublime, and also G.W.F. Hegel in his Philosophy of History, did an othering 
of Africans, using David Hume as their point of reference. However, the description of 
African by Kant will form the thrust of the next heading. 
Immanuel Kant’s Stereotyped Eurocentric Description of Africa 
Kant’s theory of race cannot be understood in isolation of his idea of human nature 
which can be appreciated within the contexts of his theory of anthropology and physical 
geography. Hence, physical geography, anthropology and human nature, according to 
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Immanuel Kant, go together; the reason being that physical geography studies the external 
aspect of man, that is, the descriptive aspect of man, while anthropology studies the inner 
aspect of man. Consequently, we can argue that Kant’s theory of human nature implies that 
he divided man into two substances: body and soul. By Kant’s emphasis on physical 
geography and anthropology, some questions are begging for answers, and they are: what is 
Kant’s idea of anthropology? What relationship exists between Kant’s idea of anthropology 
and physical geography? What is the nexus, if any, between Kant’s idea of anthropology and 
physical geography and his conception of race? The reason why these questions are 
imperative is because Kant had argued that both anthropology and physical geography are 
“twin sciences”. 
Kant’s idea of anthropology, as stated in the preceding paragraph, cannot be 
understood without his idea of physical geography. Physical geography, according to Kant, is 
defined as “the study of the natural condition of the earth and what is contained on it: seas, 
continents, mountains, rivers, the atmosphere, man, animals, plants and minerals”  (Eze, 
1997, 3). Man is included in Kant’s definition of physical geography because humans are part 
of what makes up the natural world, and just as we stated earlier, humans are made up of two 
entities: external and internal entities; the external entity represents the body while the 
internal entity represents the soul. An understanding of man here presupposes an 
understanding of the entities that makes him up: the body and the soul. This is the reason 
why Kant posited that physical geography studies the bodily aspect of man while 
anthropology studies the spiritual aspect of man. The combination of both makes the 
knowledge of man possible. Kant shows that the nexus between the body and soul, that is, 
physical geography and anthropology respectively is man when he argued that: 
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The physical geography, which I herewith announce, belongs to an idea (Idee) which 
I create for myself for purposes of useful academic instruction, and which I would 
call the preliminary exercise in the knowledge of the world . . . Here before [the 
student] lies a twofold field, namely nature and man, of which he has a plan for the 
time being through which he can put into order, according to rules, all his future 
experiences. Both parts, however, have to be considered ... not according to what their 
objects contain as peculiar to themselves (physics and empirical knowledge ,of soul), 
but what their relationship is in the whole in which they stand and in which each has 
its own position. This first form of instruction I call physical geography... the second 
anthropology (Eze, 1997, 3).  
 
Eze commented on Kant’s statement by stating that “while anthropology studies 
humans or human reality as they are available to the internal sense, geography studies the 
same phenomena as they are presented or available to the external sense” (Eze, 1997, 3). . 
The implication of Eze’s statement is that the body can be perceived by the sense organs, and 
Kant’s racial philosophy can be understood from the perspective of his conception of human 
nature as an entity that is made up of the body and soul. For instance, we can argue that 
Kant’s classification of the human person on the basis of skin colour falls under the rubric of 
his “physical geography”. In furtherance, Kant’s idea of the human person as an entity with 
moral disposition which develops character over time comes under his idea of 
“anthropology”. 
Earlier, we argued that Kant divided the human person into the internal and external 
substances which represent the roles of his physical geography and anthropology 
respectively. Since our discourse here centres on Kant’s idea of race, it becomes imperative 
to state the nexus, if any exists between Kant’s idea of physical geography, anthropology and 
race. Understandably, Kant’s idea of physical geography presupposes the descriptive 
components of the human person. By descriptive components, we mean the physical features 
the human person possesses; for instance, skin colour, facial scrub features as well as the 
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forms and sizes of the body – like the infamous Hotentot Venus. It was on the basis of this 
physical geography that Kant described the Negros (Africans) as not only those that are 
naturally inferior to the whites, but also “stupid”. To further corroborate Kant’s synthesis of 
his physical geography and anthropology in the understanding of his theory of race, one may 
not be why Thomas Jefferson argued in his book entitled Notes on the states of Virginia that 
blacks were “inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind” (Jefferson, 
1785, 168).   
Kant’s Eurocentric description of Africa is contained in his book entitled 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Other Writings. He started 
the fourth section which he entitled On National Characters so far as they Depend Upon the 
Distinct Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, with the following excerpt: 
Among the peoples of our part of the world the Italians and French are, in my 
opinion, those who most distinguish themselves in the feeling of the beautiful, but the 
Germans, the English, and the Spaniards those who are most distinguished from all 
others in the feeling of the sublime. Holland can be regarded as the land where this 
finer taste is fairly unnoticeable. The beautiful itself is either enchanting and 
touching, or laughing and charming. The former has something of the sublime in it, 
and in this feeling the mind is thoughtful and enraptured, while in the feeling of the 
second kind it is smiling and joyful (Kant, 2001, 58). 
 
Evidently, Africa and Africans are not included in the history of nations, in Kant’s 
opinion. In fact, Eze opined that Kant did a hierarchy of races and he puts it thus: STEM 
GENIUS: white brunette; First race: very blond (Northern Europe); second race: Copper-red 
(America); third race: Black (Senegambia); fourth race: Olive-Yellow (Indians) Eze, 1997). 
Kant, in describing Africa and Africans (Negroes), argued to corroborate David Hume’s 
othering of Africa and Africans in the latter’s Of National Characters. According to Kant: 
The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. Mr. 
Hume challenges anyone to adduce a single example where a Negro has demonstrated 
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talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who have been 
transported elsewhere from their countries, although very many of them have been set 
free, nevertheless not a single one has ever been found who has accomplished 
something great in art or science or shown any other worthy quality, while among the 
whites, there are always those who rise up from the lowest rabble and through 
extraordinary gifts earn respect in the world… So essential is the difference between 
these two human kinds, and it seems to be just as great with regard to the capacities of 
mind as it is with respect to colour. The religion of fetishes which is widespread 
among them is perhaps a sort of idolatry, which sinks so deeply into the ridiculous as 
ever seems to be possible for human nature. A bird’s feather, a cow’s horn, a shell, or 
any other common thing, as soon as it is consecrated with some words, is an object of 
veneration and of invocation in swearing oaths. The blacks are very vain, but in the 
Negro’s way, and so talkative that they must be driven apart from each other by 
blows (Kant, 2001, 58).  
 
No doubt, Kant’s description of Africa above does not only derogates African 
citizens, but also their thought systems. For instance, African traditional religion is described 
as “fetish”, “idolatry”. Consequently, for Kant, the Negroes (Africans) are not considered as 
humans; if they are at all, they are “stupid”. Kant went further to expose an encounter Father 
Lambert had with a Negro. As Kant puts it:  
Father Labat reports that Negro carpenter, whom he reproached for haughty treatment 
towards his wives, answered: “You whites are indeed fools, for first you make great 
concessions to your wives, and afterward you complain when they drive you mad. 
“And it might be that there were something in which perhaps deserved to be 
considered; but in short, this fellow was very black from head to foot, a clear proof 
that what he said was stupid (Kant, 2001, 3).  
 
According to Ronald Judy, in his paper article Kant and the Negro, the inference that can be 
drawn from Kant’s description of the Negro’s encounter with Father Labat is that being 
“black” is synonymous to stupidity. Judy argues:  
Kant draws an inferential relation between Labat’s Negro’s being “very black from 
head to foot” and the fact that “what he said was stupid.” In fact, his blackness is an 
obvious Beweis of the stupidity in what he said. What is Beweis? Goldwaith translates 
it as a “proof,” which tends to give it the sense of phenomenal evidence and 
substantiated demonstration, the sort of thing with which the carpenter can be 
convicted. Convicted of what? Not Kant’s earlier assertion about the Negroes of 
Africa’s natural mental deficiency, it is quite apparent that saying the stupid issues 
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from an inherent stupidity, as opposed to a momentary lapse in judgment. So saying 
the stupid results from being stupid and blackness is the proof (Beweis) of that. The 
relationship between metaphysics and the Negro is gained through this inference 
(Judy, 1991, 10). 
 
 Kant’s Eurocentric description of African can be further understood from his attempt to 
synthesize the two traditional opposing theories of knowledge: empiricism and rationalism. 
While the empiricists argued that sense experience is the basis of our knowledge claims, the 
rationalists argued that reasoning is the sole source of our knowledge. Consequently, Kant 
sought to bridge the gap between the two schools of thought. However, our argument is not 
to state Kant’s role in bridging this gap, but to expose how Kant’s synthesis of empiricism 
and rationalism can be further understood within his racial philosophy. In his magnum opus, 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that there exists are important sources of human 
knowledge and both are from the same root. As he puts it: 
There are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, 
which perhaps spring up from a common but to us unknown root. Through the 
former, objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought… To neither of 
these powers may reference be given over the other. Without sensibility, no object 
will be given to us. Without understanding, no object will be thought. Thoughts 
without contents are empty, intuition without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just 
as necessary to make intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. 
These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding 
can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can 
knowledge (Kant, 1956, 47). 
 
The question that readily comes to mind is this: what is the relationship between 
Kant’s synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, and his Eurocentric description of Africa? 
According to Judy, “what Kant terms on empirical intuition is that which is related to the 
object through sensation. Every empirical intuition of the particular has an appearance, which 
is its undetermined object” (Judy, 1991, 10). If Judy’s statement is to be explicated further, 
we can argue that Kant’s distinction between “sensibility” and “understanding” can be 
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understood within the context of his conclusion of Father Labart’s description of a Negro and 
stupidity. Since according to Kant, “thoughts without contents are empty, intuition without 
concepts are blind”, it means that the thought of a Negro presupposes the content of 
stupidity. Although Judy argued that stupidity has no empirical significance, but that 
“blackness must be thought through the understanding, according to its empirical concepts” 
(Judy, 1991, 10).  
 Kant also went further to bring into perspective, a psychological argument to his 
theory of race; this psychological perspective can be understood within the context of what 
Kant calls “gift” or “talent”. In particular, Kant used it as the basis upon which races can be 
understood. He stated that “gift” as it relates to the Americans is different from the Negroes. 
In Kant’s description of the Americans, for instance, he argued that:  
The race of the American cannot be educated. It has no motivating force, for it lacks 
affect and passion. They are not in love, thus they are also not afraid. They hardly 
speak, do not caress each other, care about nothing and are lazy ( Eze, 1997, 117). 
 
For the Negroes, Kant described them as those that are opposite the Americans. He argued: 
The race of the Negroes, one could say, is completely the opposite of the Americans; 
they are full of affect and passion, very lively, talkative and vain. They can be 
educated but only as servants (slaves), that is, they allow themselves to be trained. 
They have many motivating forces, are also sensitive, are afraid of blows and do 
much out of a sense of honour (Eze, 1997, 117).  
 
Thus, this distinction becomes imperative as it distinguishes between Kant’s of to be 
“educated” and to also educate oneself. This is the basis of Kant’s idea of “training” and 
regarding this “training’, Kant argued that it must be done in terms of physical coercion. This 
is the reason why Kant said that for Africans to be trained, they must be flogged into 
submission. For instance, he “advises us to split bamboo vane instead of a whip, so that the 
“Negro will suffer a great deal of pains (because of the Negro’s thick skin, he would not be 
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racked with sufficient agonies through whip) but without dying” (Neugebauer, 1990, 264). 
Kant went further to state that “to beat ‘the Negro’ efficiently requires a ‘split cane rather 
than a whip, because the blood needs to find a way out of the Negro’s thick skin to avoid 
festering” (Eze, 2001, 110).  
One wonders how and why Kant got to know about “training” the Negroes using a 
“cane”. The answer, to us, is not farfetched: it is that Kant probably had an idea of what slave 
trade was during the Enlightenment period. According to Eze,  
Kant sees and knows that, in fact, African slaves are flogged, ‘trained’ in his words, 
as European labour. More generally, and from a philosophical perspective, and 
perhaps in a more subtle way, Kant’s position manifests an inarticulate subscription to 
a system of thought which assumes that what is different especially that which is 
‘black’, is bad, evil, inferior, or a moral negation of ‘white,’ light, and goodness (Eze, 
2001, 110). 
 
Earlier, we argued Kant did a hierarchy of races, with the Negroes as the lowest. The basis of 
Kant’s hierarchy is that the whites are superior while other races are superior. However, Kant 
argued in his Physische Geographie, Kant argued that at birth, the skin of every baby is white 
and as time goes on, the white baby’s body turns black. For example, Kant wrote that “the 
Negroes are born white, apart from their genitals and a ring around the navel, which are 
black. During the first month of blackness spreads across the whole body from these parts” 
(Eze, 2001, 110). (Ibid). 
 Thus far, our attempt has been to conceptualize the Eurocentric description of Africa 
from the perspective Immanuel Kant. This can be understood from the nexus Kant 
established between his idea of physical geography and anthropology. Consequently, Kant 
argued that while physical geography describes the external aspect of man while 
anthropology has to do with the internal aspect of man. What can be understood from Kant’s 
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postulations? It is that Kant’s stance on skin colour cannot be overemphasized in his 
discourse of race, that is, the whites are superior in all aspects and the blacks are inferior to 
the whites. Hence, the skin colour to Kant does not only denote inferiority/superiority, but 
also it is the underlying principle for a static and an un-erratic moral characteristics. 
G.W.F. Hegel and his Eurocentric Conception of Africa 
 G.W.F. Hegel, one of the foremost philosophers who did a description of Africa that 
was not short of inferiority. In his book entitled Philosophy of History, Hegel did an 
exposition of world history and excluded Africa from it. However, it is pertinent to state here 
as a form of background what informed Hegel’s Eurocentric conception of Africa. Here, we 
will examine what is called “master-slave dialectic” in Hegel’s phenomenology. Hegel’s 
phenomenology can be understood within the context of consciousness of the subject being 
directed towards an object. Put differently, Hegel’s phenomenology of “master-slave 
dialectic” is the basis for the understanding of the self and the other. In his book entitled 
Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel argued that self-consciousness does not only exist for 
himself, but also exists for other. To explicate this further, it means that man or the individual 
does not exists alone as he is a being for others. As Hegel argued: “Self-consciousness exists 
in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in 
being acknowledged” (Hegel, 1977, 178). By virtue of acknowledgement, the other confirms 
his authenticity. Consequently, the question that comes to mind is this: what is the nexus, if 
any, exist between Hegel’s phenomenology and “master-slave dialectic”? The idea that there 
exist a nexus between these two concepts cannot be overemphasized; the reason being that 
Hegel argued that this “self-consciousness” must recognize “self-consciousness”, that is, a 
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subject must recognize the existence of another subject; although the relationship between 
these two subjects must not necessarily be cordial. Hegel further argued thus: 
Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. 
This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself for it finds itself as an other 
being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, for it does not see the other 
as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self. It must supersede this 
otherness of itself. This is the supersession of the first ambiguity, and is therefore 
itself a second ambiguity. First, it must proceed to supersede the other independent 
being in order thereby to become certain of itself as the essential being; secondly, in 
so doing it proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself. This ambiguous 
supersession of its ambiguous otherness (Hegel, 1977, 178).  
 
  Thus, it is important to state this: that the “self-consciousness” recognizes another 
“self-consciousness” does not imply that he treats the other with mutual respect. It is in this 
context that we can understand the idea of “master-slave dialectic”; hence, “self-
consciousness” is likely to be objectified. For instance, regarding the idea of the master (self) 
dominating and objectifying the slave (other) Hegel in his Philosophy of Mind as contained 
in his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, argued thus: 
The process is a battle. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another individual, 
so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am 
consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. But in like 
measure I cannot be recognized as immediate, except so far as I overcome the 
mere immediacy on my own part, and thus give existence to my freedom. But 
this immediacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness, in which 
as in its sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self, and its being for others, 
and the means for entering into relation with them (Hegel, 1931, 431).   
 
Here, in order to recognize the other, freedom must be attained, and this freedom 
cannot be realized in isolation of the other. For instance, if an individual says “I am ashamed 
of myself”, the shyness is made possible because there is an individual who is there to 
witness it. This is the reason why Martin Heidegger, for instance, argued that “Dasein is not 
only a being-in-the-world, but also a being-with-others” (Heidegger, 1962, 154). Hegel 
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corroborates this when he wrote that freedom “consists in my identity with the other, I am 
only truly free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free. “The freedom of 
one in the other unites men in an inward manner, whereas needs and necessity bring them 
together only externally” (Hegel, 1971, 431). By Hegel’s thesis on the self and the other 
above, that is, master, and the slave, we can therefore situate his Eurocentric conception of 
Africa. Thus, the basis of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic” is the basis of how Hegel described 
Africa as an inferior continent. What Hegel first did was to exclude Africa from world 
history. The reason, according to Hegel, is that Africans are incapable of rational thought and 
morality. Hegel further argued that Africa is a land characterized by “fetishism” and 
“cannibalism” and are thus waiting for the Europeans to enslave them. This is why slavery to 
Hegel is justified as it will bring about civilization and moral education to Africa. It is 
important to state here that Hegel divided Africa into three parts: Africa proper, European 
Africa and Egypt. Accordingly, Hegel writes that “Africa proper” is “the land of childhood, 
which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantel of 
Night” (Hegel, 1956, 91). 
Regarding his division of Africa into three parts, Hegel argued thus: 
One is that which lies south of the desert Sahara– Africa proper– the upland almost 
entirely unknown to us with narrow tracks along the sea; the second is that to the 
north of the desert – European Africa (if we may so call it), a coastland; the third is 
the river region of the Nile, the only valley– land of Africa, and which is in 
connection with Asia (Hegel, 1956, 91).  
 
By this, Hegel stated that Africa proper is different from European Africa and the difference 
lies in reason. This is the reason why Hegel said that Africans do not believe in God, but in 
magic and sorcery. 
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To understand Hegel’s thesis on Africa further, let us take a quote from his famous 
Philosophy of History. According to him: 
In Negro life the characteristic point is that consciousness has not yet attained to the 
realization of any substantial objective existence—as for example, God, or Law—in 
which the interest of man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes his own 
being … The Negro … exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed 
state. We must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality—all that we call 
feeling—if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious with 
humanity to be found in this type of character (Hegel, 1956, 93).  
 
We can understand from Hegel’s quote that the Negro is not yet conscious and his existence 
has not been fully attained. This is the reason why Hegel described an African as a “natural 
man in his completely wild and untamed state” (Hegel, 1956, 93).  Thus, Hegel is not willing 
to gran Africans humanity. Earlier, we had argued that Hegel’s Eurocentric conception of 
Africa cannot be discussed in isolation of his idea of “master-slave dialectic”; Hegel argued 
that Africans are slaves while the Europeans are their masters. In fact, Hegel argued that 
slavery is one of the features of the Negro. As he argued: 
Another characteristic fact in reference to the Negroes is Slavery. Negroes are 
enslaved by Europeans and sold to America. Bad as this may be, their lot in their own 
land is even worse, since there a slavery quite as absolute exists; for it is the essential 
principle of slavery, that man has not yet attained a consciousness of his freedom, and 
consequently sinks down to a mere Thing—an object of no value … Parents sell their 
children, and conversely children their parents, as either has the opportunity … To 
this want of regard for life must be ascribed the great courage, supported by enormous 
bodily strength, exhibited by the Negroes, who allow themselves to be shot down by 
thousands in war with Europeans (Hegel, 1956, 97-98).  
 
Evidently, the reason why Africans are enslaved is that they are yet to attain 
consciousness. Thus, aside the argument that Africans sold themselves to slavery, their lack 
of self-consciousness is another reason for this conundrum. To Hegel, therefore, Africans 
cannot develop politically as long as self-consciousness continues to elude them. The society 
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that lacks political development, says Hegel, is bound to be ruled by a despot. Accordingly, 
Hegel wrote that: 
Turning our attention to … political constitution … the entire nature of this race is 
such as to preclude the existence of any such arrangement. The standpoint of 
humanity at this grade is mere sensuous volition with energy of will; since universal 
spiritual laws (for example, that of the morality of the Family) cannot be recognized 
here. Universality exists only as arbitrary subjective choice. The political bond can 
therefore not possess such a character as that free laws should unite the community. 
There is absolutely no bond, no restraint upon that arbitrary volition … A ruler stands 
at the head, for sensuous barbarism can only be restrained by despotic power From 
these various traits it is manifest that want of self-control distinguishes the character 
of the Negroes (Hegel, 1956, 97.  
 
The condemnation of Africa by Hegel ranges from religious, social and political 
perspectives. From the religious perspective, for instance, Hegel argued that Africans do not 
know God and they only know how to practice magic and sorcery. From the social 
perspective, Hegel did an othering of Africans as slaves who ought to serve the Europeans. 
Regarding the political perspective, Africans, according to Hegel, are likely to be ruled by a 
despot, and this is due to their “slave” status. 
 The Eurocentric description of Africa as espoused by David Hume, Immanuel Kant 
and G.W.F. Hegel, no doubt, generated several responses and movements in form of 
criticisms. These responses are geared towards reaffirming the place of Africa in world 
history, that is, to affirm that Africans are people who possess rationality. Thus, the 
proponents of these responses argue that the Eurocentric description of Africa by Hume, 
Kant and Hegel and a host of others like Levy-Bruhl Evans Pritchard, is not adequate. 
Corroborating this stance, Adegbindin, in response to Hegel’s thesis on Africa, submits that: 
As a philosophical treatise, Hegel’s Philosophy of History disrespects Africa’s 
contribution to civilization. His interpretation of Africa’s place in world history is a 
gross misinterpretation. Traditional African culture is very complex, and Hegel’s use 
of facts is not only questionable but shallow. His understanding of African culture is 
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tainted, and his assumption – that the cultural characteristics of African people could 
only reach a significant level by contact with the outside world (Europe) – is a 
misconception that does not qualify as being historically valid, scientifically 
adequate, or culturally sound (Adegbindin, 2015, 37).  
 
Adegbindin’s position above can be understood within the context of the outright 
rejection of not only Hegel’s thesis on Africa, but also that of other Eurocentric philosophers 
and sociologists. Thus, schools of thought have emerged to show that the Eurocentric 
conception of Africa is totally flawed. For instance, we can decipher from these description 
of Africa that Africans lack rationality and history. However, schools of thought like 
Afrocentricism, Pan-Africanism and Negritude have responded to the Eurocentric 
descriptions of Africa. For the purpose of direction, we shall examine what Joseph Osei calls 
“Black Hypothesis” as a response to Hume, Kant and Hegel’s theses on Africa. 
The Imperative of Black Hypothesis in Reaffirming Africa’s Place in World History 
 Thus far, the thrust of this paper has been to conceptualize the Eurocentric description 
of Africa. This, we have been able to do from the perspectives of David Hume, Immanuel 
Kant and G.W.F. Hegel. We make bold to state here that the views of these philosophers do 
not capture all the negative views about Africa, that is, there exist philosophers and 
sociologists who did something similar to what these philosophers did during the 
Enlightenment period. We argued earlier that the Eurocentric description of Africa became 
prominent during the Enlightenment period of philosophy. Africa was seen as a retarded 
continent which nothing good could come out. Granted that Hume, Kant and Hegel were 
particular about Africa, the question that readily comes to mind is this: to what extent are the 
theses of Hume and the rest Eurocentric philosophers about Africa true? To start with, here, 
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we shall offer first, a general refutation of the Eurocentric theses on Africa before we will 
delve into the responses these theses have generated in today’s scholarship. 
Aside Afrocentrism and other theses that have been used to jettison the Eurocentric 
description of Africa, we shall examine here, what Osei calls “Black Hypothesis”. By “Black 
Hypothesis”, Osei means the thesis that philosophy emanated from Africa, especially the 
ancient Egypt. Thus, Osei used “Black Hypothesis” to refer to the following: 
(a) The first philosophers were not the ancient Greeks or ancient Europeans, but Ancient 
Egyptians. 
(b) These Ancient Egyptians were Blacks with typical Negroid features (Osei, 2019, 4). 
Osei’s thesis of “Black Hypothesis” can be understood further by making reference to 
Cheikh Diop’s idea that the civilization of ancient Egypt was black, and that African 
historians must strive at all time to reconnect with their Egyptian origin. According to Diop: 
The African historian who evades the problem of Egypt is neither modest nor 
objective, nor unruffled; he is ignorant, cowardly, and the neurotic. Imagine, if you 
can, the uncomfortable position of a western historian who was to write the history of 
Europe without referring to Greco-Latin Antiquity and try to pass that off as a 
scientific approach (Diop, 1974, xiv). 
 
He also went further to state that: 
The ancient Egyptians were Negroes. The moral fruit of their civilization is to be 
counted among the assets of Black world. Instead of presenting itself to history as an 
insolvent debtor, that Black world is the very initiator of the “western” civilization 
flaunted before our eyes today (Diop, 1974, xiv).  
 
That there exists a nexus between Diop’s above excerpts and Osei’s idea of “Black 
Hypothesis” cannot be overemphasized as both placed emphasis on Egypt as the inception of 
philosophy, and history and by implication, Africans should be proud of Egypt just as the 
Europeans are proud of Greco-Latin Antiquity. 
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 To further buttress the “Black Hypothesis”, George James, an Afro-American author 
wrote that what is today known as “Greek Philosophy” is epiphenomenal of Egyptian 
“Philosophy” (James, 1954, 153). Thus, the works stolen from Egypt by the Greek 
philosophers were not at any time modified, neither were they edited. George James further 
espoused this in his book entitled Stolen Legacy. In this book, George James wrote that since 
there exist anthropological discoveries that have shown that philosophy and science were 
first bequeathed to civilization by the people North Africa, in particular, Egypt, then Africans 
are worthy of “praise” and “honour”. As he puts it: 
Now that it has been shown that philosophy and the arts and sciences were 
bequeathed to civilization by the people of North Africa and not by the people of 
Greece; the pendulum of praise and honor is due to shift from the people of Greece to 
the people of African continent who are the rightful heirs of such praise and honor. 
Further, this is going to mean a tremendous change in world opinion, and attitude, for 
all people and races who accept the new philosophy of African redemption, i.e. the 
truth that the Greeks were not the authors of Greek Philosophy; but the people of 
North Africa; would change their opinion from one of disrespect for the Black people 
throughout the world and treat them accordingly (James, 1954, 153).  
 
Thus, it is important, says George James, for the Black peoples to change their mentality for 
them to be able to reassert themselves in world civilizations, that is, the Black peoples must 
change their status of being an inferior race to a race that is identical to great civilizations. 
 The idea of “Black Hypothesis” was further corroborated by Herodotus who argued 
that the idea of immortality of the soul, a concept which is often traced to Pythagoras and 
Plato, was an Egyptian invention. The Egyptians were the first to advance the idea that the 
soul is immortal and that when the body dies it enters into another animal which is then 
born...Some Greeks later put this idea as though it were their own; I know their names, but I 
do not transcribe them (Herodotus – Ancient history encyclopedia. By Herodotus and George 
James arguments, it is obvious that Egypt is a force to be reckoned in world history and 
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civilizations. Consequently, it is important for the Black peoples to hold on to “The Black 
Hypothesis” as one of the ways to jettison the Eurocentric description of Africa as a 
continent that is backward, and a continent which its inhabitants are sub-humans. 
 To further understand the concept of “Black Hypothesis” according to Osei, how can 
we forget the all-encompassing system of understanding reality from the Egyptian 
perspectives? The ancient Egyptians had a system of writing called the “Hieroglyphic Signs”. 
In fact, Plotinus, the Egyptian-born Roman philosopher and the founder of Neo-Platonism, 
writes about the “Hieroglyphic Sign” and conceptualizes it as ‘‘Egyptian sages showed their 
consummate science by using symbolic signs. . . . Thus, each hieroglyph constituted a sort of 
science of wisdom’’ (Obenga, 2004, 36). Obenga further describes the “Hieroglyphic Signs” 
as follows: 
What hieroglyphs disclose is of unique interest in the intellectual history of humanity. 
There are more than 800 hieroglyphic signs; they describe all the classes and 
categories of beings and things held by creation. Hieroglyphs are the complete and 
systematized conceptualization of all that is; they are an all-embracing knowledge of 
reality. Egyptian hieroglyphs express the universe, as it is known and as it exists; they 
mean, refer to, the totality of things. It is because of the universe that there are 
hieroglyphs. In a sense, all things are hieroglyphs, and hieroglyphs are all things. This 
is why it was impossible for the Egyptians to conceive the idea of non-existence in 
the sense of the absence of the existent. Since the universe is beauty, abundance, 
plentitude, diversity, harmony, and unity, hieroglyphs reproduce by drawings all these 
manifestations of the universe. Everything is in hieroglyphs, such as, in random order, 
man and his occupations, woman and her activities, deities, mammals, birds, 
amphibious animals, reptiles, fish, insects, plants, trees, sky, earth, mountains, water, 
buildings, ships, domestic and funerary furniture, temple furniture and sacred 
emblems, crowns, dress, staves, warfare, hunting, butchery, agriculture, crafts and 
professions, rope, fiber, baskets, bags, vessels of stone, earthenware, cakes, writing, 
games, music, geometrical figures, etc., (Obenga, 2004, 36).  
 
No doubt that the description of the “Hieroglyphic Sign” by Obenga suggests that it is 
philosophical. Thus, the ancient Egyptians had philosophical contents in their thoughts. It is 
on this basis that Obenga, in his Ancient History of African Philosophy, argued that it is an 
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academic prejudice to state that philosophy began from the ancient Greece. While it is widely 
argued that the meaning of philosophy and philosopher are by-products of Greece, researches 
have shown that the meaning of philosophy was first found in Egypt. In fact, the German 
Egyptologist Hellmut Brunner argues that the meaning of the term “philosopher” was found 
in an inscription written on Antef; the definition of a “philosopher” is given as follows: 
[He is the one] whose heart is informed about these things which would be otherwise 
ignored, the one who is clear-sighted when he is deep into a problem, the one who is 
moderate in his actions, who penetrates ancient writings, whose advice is [sought] to 
unravel complications, who is really wise, who instructed his own heart, who stays 
awake at night as he looks for the right paths, who surpasses what he accomplished 
yesterday, who is wiser than a sage, who brought himself to wisdom, who asks for 
advice and sees to it that he is asked advice (Obenga, 2004, 36). (Ibid). 
 
Thus, the whole enterprise of philosophy, as can be seen, to a considerable extent, we can say 
began from the ancient Egypt. This is because “Hieroglyphic Sign” is seen as an all-
embracing philosophical concept and as such, the history of philosophy is incomplete if the 
philosophical works as found in Egyptian civilization are not properly referenced. Hence, the 
purpose of “Black Hypothesis” is simply an attempt to ensure that Africa, as the fons et origo 
of civilization, needs its place to be reaffirmed as both philosophical and anthropological 
discoveries have affirmed this stance. 
Conclusion 
Thus far, the attempt of this paper has been to conceptualize the Eurocentric description 
of Africa and it has been done with references to David Hume, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. 
Hegel. For these philosophers, Africa is a continent that is not part of world history and its 
inhabitants are inferior to the Europeans. This they did by stating that the inferiority of 
Africans is both internal and external. Internal as it relates to certain behavioral traits and 
external as it relates to the physical features of an African. It is important to note that the 
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theses of Hume, Kant and Hegel cannot be scientific proven as we have been able to expose 
with the case “Black Hypothesis” as espoused by Diop and Osei, Egyptian civilization is not 
only authentic, but also waters down the western ethnocentric idea that Africa is not part of 
world history, and therefore, it is a way of showing that Africans are humans with rationality, 
no matter the Eurocentric perception of them.  
   Thus, aside Afrocentrism and “Black Hypothesis” that have been used to reject the 
Eurocentric theses on Africa, the prominent philosopher of history, Johann Gottfried Herder, 
argued against the idea that the white race is the superior race. It is against this background 
that Smith suggests that we should go back to the pre-racial conception of humanity as 
espoused by Herder, a conception of humanity which sees all men as one. Africa’s history 
therefore, needs to be rewritten and in doing this, it should absolve itself of the European 
description of it. As Nkrumah argues: 
Our history needs to be written as the history of our society, not as the story of 
European adventurers. African society must be treated as enjoying its own integrity; 
its history must be a mirror of that society, and the European contact must find its 
place in this history only as an African experience, even a crucial one. That is to say, 
the European contact needs to be assessed and judged from the point of view of the 
principles animating African society, and from the point of view of the harmony and 
progress of this society (Nkrumah, 1970, 63). 
 
We can conclude here that although the Eurocentric description of Africa by Hume et al has 
been used to justify the racial perspective on Africa till date, it is important to note that 
Africa’s place in world’s history needs to be reaffirmed, as suggested by the philosophical 
contents of “Black Hypothesis”.      
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